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. 8, 1975. After the Presenter's information had been presented the Honor
Court, in closed deliberation decided
that (1) the alleged offense was sufficiently serious to warrant a trial, (2) the
alleged offense was in fact a violation of
the Honor Code, and, (3) all the evidence proffered by the Presenter would
be capable of supporting a verdict of
guilty if proved. Trial was held May 12 &
13, 1975.

OPINION

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE
SCHOOL OF LAW
HONOR COURT DECISION 75-2
Before Garrity, Chief Justice, Snyder
and Wilkes, Associate Justices and
Houff, Alternate Justice.
Mr. Chief Justice Garrity delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The defendant, a full time, Day student at the University of Baltimore
School of Law was indicted, and
brought to a trial on the merits, on a
charge of an Honor Code violation allegedly committed by him. The Honor
Court, by a unanimous decision found
the defendant guilty of violating the established Honor Code.
FACTS
Both the defendant and the complainant were registered in the same
course during the Spring 1975 semester.
The evidence shows that this course had
approximately nine participants. On the
last day of class the instructor entertained quections about the upcoming
examination; questions which the defendant, for his own purposes, chose to
tape record, and for this purpose, sat in
the front row of the class room. The
complainant claims to have entered the
class about twenty minutes after the
scheduled time, and this contention is
supported by both the instructor's recollection, in a deposition of his testimony,
and by the defendant's tape of the last
class. ,The tape of the last class reveals
the exact content of the instructor's lecture and comments on the last day of
class. He explicity stated that some areas
covered during the semester would be
on the exam, and likewise, that some

areas studied during the year would not
be on the exam. But at no time did he
state that this review or list of possible
and available exams areas was exhaustive or complete.
Some days later, while the defendant
was studying in the Langsdale Library,
the complainant approached him, and
asked if he had taken the exam yet.
Upon receiving an affirmative answer,
and knowing that he himself had not yet
taken the exam, the complainant declined further information, ceased discussion, and dismissed himself to the
Law Lounge. Minutes later the defendant entered the lounge and, by his own
admission at the trial, uttered the words
"It's what he said it would be. Study
Parts I and II." The defendant without
further conversation, thereafter
promptly left the lounge. The complaninant, in an apparent display of emotional distress, announced to the seven
other people in the lounge that the defendant had just committed an Honor
Code Violation, and that "Parts I and II"
mentioned, referenced materials in a
course that the two of them had participated in, and that this information was
tendered in an effort by the defendant to
limit the scope of study necessary by the
complainant. After discussion with those
people in the lounge, the complainant
reported what had transpired to a Presenter of the Facts.
The Presenter ofthe Facts, after an initial investigation requested a preliminary
hearing. Such hearing was held on May

The Court examined and dissected
each of the defendant's arguments, and
in each, found a fallacious foundation
being relied upon. The defendant first
asserted that the words conveyed to the
complainant, were no more than what
the instructor had conveyed to the class
during its' last meeting, and that the defendant felt obligated to relay this information because he believed the complainant to have been absent from the last
class. His recording of the last class was
introduced into evidence to support this
contention.
The Court does not find that the defendant relayed to the complainant the
same as that information received by the
class. It is not even "essentially" the
same information. That conveyed by the
defendant is more restrictive than the instructor's remarks, and was tendered in
an effort by the defendant to aid the
complainant, by allowing him to limit his
scope of course material needing study
for the exam. The veracity of the defendant's stated belief of the complainant's
absence on the last class is in serious
jeopardy for two reasons. Firstly, with
only nine students in the course, and the
defenant occupying a front row seat, as
asserted, the Court doubts that he would
fail to notice the late arriving complainant on this particular day. Secondly, the
defendant swears that his remarks on the
day of the offense were, verbatim, "It's
what he said it would be. "Study Parts I
and II." This statement reflects a clear
reference to the last class meeting,
wherein the instructor stated what would
be on the exam. If the defendantthought
the complainant to be absent, how could
be expect the complainant to know
"what he said it would be"?
The defendant argued that he did not
possess the requisite specific intent to

violate the Honor Code, especially since
he believes he made no reference to the
exam, or of the contents of the exam.
The Court responds to this argument
again with a twofold answer. Firstly, the
specific intent to violate the Honor Code
is not the test developed to establish the
necessary intent. But only a general in~
tention to give or unauthorised aid to
another in the course of work need be
proven to justify a violation. Secondly,
the Court found that the defendant did
in fact make a direct reference to the
exam, and its contents when he made
his remarks. The first word of his statement "It's" is a pronoun, and as such,
can be easily and grammatically replaced with the noun "The exam" so
that the statement would be read "The
exam is what he said it would be. Study
Parts I and II."
The defendant next asserts that because of the unique situation existing in
this particular course, the words "Parts I
and II" would have little, if any, value to
the complainant, as he asserts. He argued that such aid was so broad, and
composed such a substantive part of the
course material, that it could not have
constituted assistance within the meaning of an Honor Code violation. In support of this argument, the defendant introduced into evidence a deposition of
the instructor, agreeing with such a position; and further argued that reliance of
the proposed aid was crucial to a determination of guilt. The Honor Court does
not agree.
The fact that the aid given by the defendant may not have been used by the
accuser, or was so broad as to be of little
value to the examinee, is immaterial to
the finding of an Honor Code violation
of cheating. Cheating is defined by the
Honor Code as "the giving or receiving
of unauthorized aid." Nowhere in the
text is the word "valuable aid" found,
and the draftsmen of the Code did not
intend it to be interpreted to mean "valuable unauthorized aid." The subjective
judgment required to determine valuableness, would render the Honor Code
literally useless.
The Presenter of the Facts produced
sufficient evidence, the weight of which
the defendant failed to adequately defend himself qgainst, to compel this

Court to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was gulity of violating
the Honor Code.
The defendant was orally reprimanded by this Court and ordered to
seek an appointment with Dean Curtis to
discuss this incident, and verdict, in view
of his preparation in becoming a respected member of the Bar.
The Court further wrote to the defendant and informed him that because of
his actions he had seriously jeopardized
the integrity and effectiveness of our
school's exam system. That the system
would only work properly when all participants respected the honest and diligent efforts of their fellow students, and
that anything less than that rendered the
system a complete failure. The defendant was made aware that he received
only a copy of the letter to him, and that
the Chief Justice was retaining the original copy to insert in the defendant's
permanent student file in the event that
he was ever found guilty of another
Honor Code infraction while a student at
this institution. The defendant is considered to be in a status of probation until
he has his law school diploma in his
hand.
Mr. Justice Snyder, concumng:
In judging whether one's remark concerning an examination constitutes a violation of the Honor Code, the determination must rest on the particular facts of
the situation involved. In light of the new
examination procedure, a proper test

might be as follows:
1. that the student making the remark
had already taken the exam or has unauthorized knowledge of it, and
2. that the student hearing the remark
has not at that point taken that same
exam, but intends to do so, and
3. that the remark results in the giving
of aid by either narrowing the course
material to be stressed in studying for the
examination, or by specifically stating
parts of the course material that were
covered on the exam.
In applying the elements of the above
test, specific intent, value of the disclosure, knowledge of the existence of the
above elements on the part of the participants in the conversation, are all totally
irrelevant to the finding of guilt.
Such a broad test is the price that must
be paid in having such a liberally administered exam procedure, and still
maintain the integrity and honor of the
student body. Unless one is rightfully
certain that the person he is conversing
with regarding the examination has already taken it, and no one else is overhearing the conversation, he converses
regarding the examination at his own
risk. Short of limiting one's remarks to infinitely and broadly descriptive adjactives regarding the examination as a
whole such as "fair''', "easy", "difficult",
"rediculous", students at exam time are
best advised to observe the old adage
"silence is the best policy" as being the
safest and wisest course to pursue.
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